Malaysia: a disinterested peace broker?

MANILA, Philippines – There are several striking parallels in the insurgency problems faced by fellow Southeast Asian countries Thailand and the Philippines. Both are non-Muslim majority countries with a long-running Muslim rebellion both in their geographic south.

The timelines of the Muslim rebellion in both countries are also comparable with the Pattani United Liberation Organization (for Thailand) founded in 1968 and the Moro National Liberation Front (for the Philippines) born in 1969. Both rebel outfits became very active in the 1970s, before splinter groups came into being. But the similarity does not end there.

Both countries also share a border – a contiguous jungle land border in the case of Thailand and a rather porous maritime boundary in the case of the Philippines – shared with Malaysia, a country whose role in both conflicts is mired with ambivalence and controversy.

While recent Malaysian efforts to help foster peace in the restive southern regions of its two neighbors have been lauded, Malaysia’s past record of involvement in both insurgencies continues to haunt and cast doubt on Kuala Lumpur (KL) being an effective neutral interlocutor.   

Mindanao experience

Malaysian involvement in the Muslim insurgency in southern Philippines is one of the principal reasons why KL’s credentials in the GPH-MILF peace process has been the subject of criticism, with some arguing that Malaysia’s participation actually undermines the entire peace deal altogether.

Instead of uniting the Bangsamoro people, Malaysia was seen as abetting division within the Bangsamoro community by brokering a deal largely seen as favoring only one group, namely the Maguindanaons (which form the power base of MILF), while other influential groups, notably the Tausugs (the traditional power base of the MNLF) and the Sulu Sultanate were not thoroughly involved.

As the peacemaker, couldn’t KL have aimed for a more inclusive and comprehensive peace process that takes into account the aspirations of all major stakeholders?

The Sabah complication

Long a major irritant in bilateral relations of the Philippines and Malaysia, the Sabah issue complicates Malaysia’s involvement in the Mindanao peace process. This make many in the Philippines doubt the wisdom of selecting KL as mediator, with them thinking that relinquishing the Sabah claim may be an incentive or a quid pro quo for KL in arranging the peace agreement.

The fact that the Sulu Sultanate and the perception that Tausugs, who feel strongly about the Sabah issue, were never thoroughly engaged in the Malaysian-brokered peace framework further raised doubts about KL’s real motives.

The Malaysian response to the Lahad Datu standoff, widely seen by many in the Philippines as excessive, and the violent crackdown that followed, could have serious repercussions on the peace deal that KL painstakingly worked for.

Refugees arriving in southern Philippines reported abuses, discrimination and forced eviction committed by Malaysian security forces in the conduct of Operation Daulat. It may be difficult for Filipino Muslims to disassociate the peace deal, regardless of its worthy merits, from the actions of its broker.

And when a referendum or voting comes to implement this KL-mediated peace framework, it may face an uphill climb winning the hearts and minds of Tausugs and other stakeholders who feel unhappy with how it was negotiated.

The Kelantan connection

Malaysia’s peace endeavors in Thailand’s largely Muslim deep south is also beset with several problems. Unlike Sabah which is far from Peninsular Malaysia, disturbances in Thailand’s southern provinces, notably in Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala, present a more pressing security issue since it may have a chance of spilling over the border.

In addition, the people in Malaysia’s northern state of Kelantan express strong sympathy towards Thai Muslims who are basically ethnic Malays, professing the same faith, speaking the same language and practicing similar cultural traditions.

In fact, Pattani has been a former Malay sultanate, before it was conquered by Ayutthaya. It became officially part of Thailand only with the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty. The flag of PULO, which is one of the oldest, most organized and largest rebel outfits fighting in Thailand’s extreme south, has striking resemblances to that of the Malaysian flag.

Similar to the case of Muslim insurgents in southern Philippines in the past, Thai Muslim rebels also received some training and support from Malaysia. They also seek refuge across the border when hard pressed by Thai military offensives.

Thai authorities, in the past, complained about what they saw as failure on the part of KL to boot out rebel camps and supply lines in Kelantan and prevent easy transit of rebels to and from Malaysian soil. Thus, for long, many in Thailand have viewed Malaysia with suspicion.

Unbiased peace broker?

Within the Philippines and Thailand, efforts to internationalize a domestic affair – resolving a local rebellion – by inviting a third party mediator came under fire from some groups. Aside from welcoming foreign interference, it was also seen as a show of weakness on the part of the central government to resolve a homegrown decades-old conflict.

But successful episodes of conflict resolution brought about by international mediation, as in the case of Aceh, may have prompted a rethinking on the part of Manila and Bangkok. However, while it was a Finnish NGO group that arranged the peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Acehnese rebel group GAM, it was KL, with its ambivalent and controversial record in the Muslim insurgencies in its non-Muslim majority neighbors, which was chosen as mediator. 

Malaysia has an interest in securing its borders, preventing the spread of violence in its jurisdiction and earning the goodwill of its neighbors. As a member of the OIC, KL also feels strongly about the sorry plight of Muslims in non-Muslim majority countries.

In addition, the country also wants to boost its credentials as a responsible member of the international community committed to peaceful means of resolving disputes. This is attested to by its decision to submit itself to arbitration in resolving its territorial and maritime disputes with Singapore over Pedra Branca and with Indonesia over Sipadan and Ligitan.

Peace in southern Thailand and southern Philippines is to Malaysia’s interest. Border security, refugee concerns, prevention of collateral damage and earning the goodwill of neighbors should motivate KL to act for peace. But for KL to be a more suitable mediator, it needs to come to terms with its past and refrain from using its peace initiatives as a leverage in resolving unsettled claims. – Rappler.com

 

Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a Research Assistant at the University of the Philippines Asian Center, where he is also taking up his MA in Asian Studies. The views expressed here are the author’s own.