Thailand

How politicians skirt anti-dynasty laws

JC Punongbayan

This is AI generated summarization, which may have errors. For context, always refer to the full article.

Perhaps the most straightforward way of diminishing the power held by ineffective and abusive political dynasties is by weeding them out

One of the most basic truisms in economics is that people respond to incentives. 

That is why a greater use of CCTVs contributes to deterring crime. That is why a midnight oil price hike announced in the news induces people to gas up their vehicles hours before it happens.

That is why giving poor families conditional cash transfers for a duration of time induces them to send their kids to school and have them checked up at the health center regularly.

Indeed, almost everyone can be induced to act in one way or another as long as the appropriate incentives are in place. This idea is especially important when it comes to public policy since government is in a crucial position to change the incentives faced (and thus, the actions made) by a great proportion of the population. Government does this primarily using the tools of taxation, regulation, and legislation.

Crafting the correct incentives, however, is a difficult business since incentives can have both a direct and indirect impact on people’s behavior. Failing to anticipate the indirect consequences of incentives can lead to outcomes even contrary to the behavior being sought.

For instance, US seatbelt laws have been found to result in more accidents — not less — since the safer drivers felt behind the wheel, the faster they drove. In Israeli day care centers, introducing a monetary fine for parents picking their kids up late resulted in more late-coming parents since they learned that they could “pay” for their tardiness.

And China’s one-child policy has been linked to the estimated 60 million “missing girls” as of 2007, owing to the cultural preference for boys and the consequent rise in sex-selective abortions.

Political dynasties

We now turn our attention to an area of Philippine politics that seems to be riddled with unintended consequences as well: political dynasties.

Political dynasties are hardly a unique feature of Philippine politics. There are the Bushes and Kennedys of the US, the Koizumis of Japan, the Nehru-Gandhis of India, the Lópezes of Colombia, and the Benns of Britain, to name a few.

However, the participation of political dynasties in the Philippine scene is among the largest and most enduring in the world. Whereas 60% of lawmakers elected in 2007 had a previous lawmaker-relative, only 7% of US lawmakers had such affiliations in the same year. There are also around 178 active political dynasties in the Philippines, with 94% of provinces having at least one political dynasty.

Figures like these contribute to the impression, echoed by Sen Miriam Defensor-Santiago, that the Philippines is the “political dynasty capital of the world.”

Philippine political dynasties of course date back from the maharlika class of pre-colonial times, and eventually the principalía of the Spanish regime — members of which eventually took hold of the first elective positions during the American regime as a result of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Since then, prominent families such as the Marcoses and Aquinos have emerged, along with countless other families across the nation.

The power held by political families extends not only across space but also across time. Research shows that by 2016, at least 55 families will have held on to power for at least 20 years straight.

There are even some local positions that have been held for as long as 43 years (the Abadillas of Ilocos Norte) and 37 years (the Albanos of Isabela, Cojuangcos of Tarlac, and Ortegas of La Union)!

Term limits

The concentration of political power among a few prominent families can lead to negative consequences, like obstacles to reforms at the local level; rent-seeking and corruption; and a small pool of talent from which the electorate can choose its leaders.

One way seen to limit the hold on power by political dynasties is the introduction of term limits. Indeed, after the Marcos regime the 1987 Constitution provided for a clause “prohibiting” political dynasties.

More importantly, it introduced consecutive term limits for all elected offices, in the hope of creating more competition during elections and removing long-term incumbents from office.

The term-limit introduction altered the rules of the game, and hence the incentives within the country’s political arena both at the national and local levels. Over the years, political dynasties have responded to these new rules, in the process exploiting considerable loopholes in the law and leading to the term-limit provision’s ineffectiveness and unintended consequences.

A catalog of strategies

Pablo Querubín of MIT did some research on political dynasties in the Philippines, and his analysis of strategies by which dynasties circumvent the term-limit provision proves to be a useful way by which we can better understand political dynamics in the country.

In particular, he identifies 3 creative strategies (slightly renamed) by which dynasties hold on to power:

1) The “benchwarming” strategy

Remember that the Constitution provides for a limit on consecutive terms, not on the number of terms a politician can be elected for during his or her lifetime. This results in what is called the “benchwarming” strategy (shown in Figure 1) where politician A is replaced by a relative (politician B) for one term, after which politician A returns and serves for another series of terms.

This was the case, for instance, for Rep Antonio Cuenco of the 2nd district of Cebu who, after serving for 3 consecutive terms, was replaced by his wife Nancy for just one term, after which he returned to serve for another 9 years (a total of 22 years between husband and wife in one position).

 Figure 1 — The “benchwarmer” strategy; adopted from Querubín [2011].

2) The “swapping” strategy

Figure 2 — Alternating offices; adopted from Querubín [2011].

More often, however, an incumbent would rather not cease political power completely while giving way to a benchwarmer, in the same way that a benchwarmer doesn’t want to settle for just being a benchwarmer. That is, relatives often just swap elective positions among themselves, never really giving up power while observing term limits.

This was exactly the case for the Romualdos of Camiguin. Figure 2 shows that after 3 terms as congressman for Camiguin’s lone district, Pablo Romualdo moved on to become governor, giving way to his son Jurdin.

After serving for 9 years in their respective positions they went around their term limits by swapping positions in the 2007 elections (a total of 22 years between father and son in two positions).

3) The “ladderized” strategy

Figure 3 — Expansion of power across local and national positions; adopted from Querubín [2011].

Lastly, we have the strategy where more and more family members can be introduced to politics by having elder relatives take on higher elective positions (and not necessarily swapping positions) to make room for their younger relatives. In the process, this strategy could allow a family to potentially hold several local and national positions simultaneously.

The Zubiris of Bukidnon are an example. After being faced with term limits, Rep Jose Zubiri Jr went on to become governor, giving way to his son Migz.

After both reached the end of their terms, Jose and Migz did not swap: Migz went on to a higher position (senator) while Jose did not come back as representative. Instead, another son, Jose III, became congressman (totaling 22 years between father and sons in 3 positions).

Note that many prominent political dynasties have used this local-national ladderized strategy to reach even the country’s top elective positions (president and vice president), like the Ejercito-Estradas, the Arroyos, and the Binays.

Legal loopholes

All of these strategies demonstrate how ineffective term limits have been in reducing the extent and magnitude of power held by political dynasties in the country. Politicians, just like most other people, respond to incentives.

Unfortunately, the incentives brought about by the Constitution’s term-limit provision resulted in loopholes happily exploited by dynasties, resulting in unintended consequences.

What’s more troubling is that creating and sustaining a dynasty need not be too difficult. Querubín’s (2011) research shows that the mere fact of winning in Philippine elections, even by just a margin, is sufficient to boost one’s probability of having a relative hold office in the future by as much as 4 times.

Were the crafters of the Constitution — many of them politicians themselves — altogether blind to the possible consequences of the term-limit provision? Or did they intentionally make it weak enough so their families themselves can go around it when the need arises? Nobody can be sure.

A principal-agent problem

What’s sure is that nobody can expect an anti-dynasty law to emerge from the chambers of Congress any time soon: There’s a principal-agent problem at work, one that simply cannot be wished away.

That is, there’s a fundamental disconnect between what the principals want (the people want an anti-dynasty bill), and what the agents want (the lawmakers want to hold on to power as much as possible). No lawmaker can ever be expected to support a law that could potentially bring about his and his family’s own political demise.

Significant reforms could possibly come from a stronger party system or the introduction of lifetime term limits (instead of consecutive term limits). A greater understanding by the people of the incentives faced by political clans could also help.

But given the complexity of breaking down dynasties, perhaps still the best and most straightforward way of diminishing the power held by corrupt, ineffective, and abusive political dynasties is by weeding them out through the educated vote. – Rappler.com

 

JC Punongbayan holds a master’s degree in economics from the UP School of Economics (UPSE). He is also a summa cum laude graduate of the same school. His views are independent of the views of his affiliations.

 

Add a comment

Sort by

There are no comments yet. Add your comment to start the conversation.

Summarize this article with AI

How does this make you feel?

Loading
Download the Rappler App!
Boy, Person, Human

author

JC Punongbayan

Jan Carlo “JC” Punongbayan, PhD is an assistant professor at the University of the Philippines School of Economics (UPSE). His professional experience includes the Securities and Exchange Commission, the World Bank Office in Manila, the Far Eastern University Public Policy Center, and the National Economic and Development Authority. JC writes a weekly economics column for Rappler.com. He is also co-founder of UsapangEcon.com and co-host of Usapang Econ Podcast.