Holding Court – Spurs trump individual talent with teamwork

At the start of this year’s NBA finals, we predicted San Antonio to win in six games against the two-time defending champion Miami Heat. Never did we think the Spurs would have it much easier than we figured.

The Spurs of Gregg Popovich, whose Big Three of Tim Duncan, Tony Parker and Manu Ginobili paled in comparison to the Heat’s Big Three of LeBron James, Dwyane Wade and Chris Bosh because of their more advanced age, if nothing else, nonetheless had an advantage over their counterparts: They had a whole bunch of guys behind them who could offer quality, starting-caliber support while the Miami Three just had a sprinkling of players whose performance on any given day may be compared to watching a game of craps.

But lest this simply comes down to which team had the better talent – heck, Miami wouldn’t have been blown out four out of five times if it did, what with the world’s best player, James, in the lineup – one should instead look at the philosophy, the system under which both teams operate.

The Heat obviously rely to a great extent on the Big Three, whose coming together in 2010 came with boasts of “not one…  not five, not six…” in reference to the number of titles they would be winning (a show of hubris that, come to think of it, didn’t sit well with the basketball world outside of South Beach, Florida). This is obviously anchored on Heat president Pat Riley’s unspoken but apparent philosophy of putting up a great team, nay, a super team by getting a group of great players.

The Spurs, while they have their own Big Three (which does apply more in the context of this core group having led this team in a distinguished manner for a long time), actually rely more on a system built around the efficient functioning of various parts, with their core group simply providing the leadership as well as the stability in crucial situations. Spurs GM R.C. Buford has been generally regarded as the best in his profession precisely for this ability to find players who can be developed and thrive in such a system.

The Spurs thus have guys like Kawhi Leonard, who just won Finals MVP honors, Boris Diaw (who, hard to believe, was waived by such a powerhouse as Charlotte a couple of years back), Danny Green, Tiago Splitter and Patty Mills (though Mills was the leading scorer in the 2012 London Olympics while playing for his native Australia) who may not necessarily be individual standouts but who can excel within a system. This system, of course, has been developed by the best coach in the game, Gregg Popovich, and puts a premium on teamwork and making plays more efficiently than the other team on both ends.

This is the great divide between the Heat and Spurs philosophies, though on the surface, they may look similar in terms of trying to execute basic plays on offense and defense. The Spurs simply thrive using a more democratic system that harnesses (and develops) every player on the roster while the Heat are more dependent on their big stars and barely provide their supporting players the platform to provide more than complementary support like the Spurs do to their bench.  

You think Mills is all that much better than Mario Chalmers, the Most Outstanding Player in the 2008 NCAA Tournament who put in the three-point shot that sent the game between Kansas and Memphis into overtime and helped the Jayhawks win their third championship? But while Mills thrived in these finals, hitting 5-of-8 three-pointers in Game 5 alone that served as daggers in the Spurs’ clinching 104-87 triumph, Chalmers stunk it up almost all throughout, averaging a paltry 4.4 points while shooting 33.3 percent from the floor, including a horrid 14.3 percent from beyond the arc.

Fact is, it was from the point guard position that the Heat suffered the most in this series, and if they just had a viable option at that spot instead of James doing all the playmaking chores, the series could have been more competitive than it was.

The undeniable fact is that San Antonio’s reserves made their Heat counterparts virtually disappear in this series. The Spurs’ bench mob, which led all teams in the regular season with over 45 points per game, outscored the Heat’s second unit by 14 points per game in their matchup. In terms of plus-minus differential, the Spurs’ bench players were a whopping plus-91 while the Heat’s were an abysmal minus-81.

The top-to-bottom numbers attest to the Spurs’ superiority over the Heat in terms of distribution of the load.  Eight Spurs players, led by Parker’s 18.0-point average, averaged at least six points while a total of only five (that’s right, five) Heat players, led by James’ 28.2 norm, could reach that many.

For the record, here are the key contributors for each team: 

San Antonio – Parker (18.0 ppg, 4.6 apg, 47.9 FG pct., 41.7 3-pt.), Leonard (17.8 ppg, 6.4 rpg, 61.2 FG pct., 57.9 3-pt.), Duncan (15.4 ppg, 10.0 rpg, 56.9 FG pct.), Ginobili (14.4 ppg, 4.4 apg, 50.0 FG pct., 41.7 3-pt.), Mills (10.2 ppg, 54.3 FG pct., 56.5 3-pt.), Green (9.2 ppg, 53.1 FG pct., 45.0 3-pt.), Diaw (6.2 ppg, 8.6 rpg, 5.8 apg), Splitter (6.2 ppg, 3.4 rpg, 70.6 FG pct.).

Miami – James (28.2 ppg, 7.8 rpg, 4.0 apg, 57.1 FG pct., 51.9 3-pt.), Wade (15.2 ppg, 3.8 rpg, 2.6 apg, 43.8 FG pct., 33.3 3-pt.), Bosh (14.0 ppg, 5.2 rpg, 54.9 FG pct., 38.5 3-pt.), Ray Allen (9.8 ppg, 3.0 rpg, 41.5 FG pct., 40.9 3-pt.), Rashard Lewis (8.6 ppg, 50.0 FG pct., 45.5 3-pt.).

So how did it all come down to this?

First of all, the Spurs system employed such a tremendous ball movement that it’s bound to become the template from now on for teams to achieve success. The Spurs did it in this series in such an exquisite manner that the previous perception of San Antonio being a boring team may have forever been debunked. “Like a sunset over Maui or a personal Frank Sinatra concert, the Spurs’ ball movement is a thing of beauty,” David Nurse of HoopsHype says.

Susbcribing to the time-proven principle that the ball can always move faster than the person, Popovich implemented that principle to a “T” by instilling that concept into his players’ heads. When the Spurs did move the ball the way they’re supposed to, not even the Heat’s vaunted defense, which until the Indiana series worked so effectively, could keep up. In the Pacers’ 111-92 victory in Game 3, a contest that presaged what could be in store for Miami, the Spurs passed the ball 93 more times than Miami and repeatedly found the open man for threes as they broke away early. In their murderous 107-86 triumph in the next game, they even surpassed that number by passing the ball 113 times more than their rivals.  Even in their drives to the lane, the Spurs often found the open man as 36 percent of those drives ended with a kickout to an open teammate.

“The Heat didn’t suddenly get old, but San Antonio’s ball movement can suddenly reveal their age,” Ethan S. Strauss of ESPN’s TrueHoop observed while saying that Chris Andersen and Wade were moving very slowly on defense. “They could make up for the defensive breakdowns if they had a rim protector, but they (didn’t) have one.”

“Miami was helpless in trying to rotate to the open men that were inevitably found by San Antonio’s crisp passing on every possession,” Tas Melas of TNT’s The Starters said.

What compounded matters for the Heat was their ploy of often sending double teams at the Spurs. In the first four games that they did this, for instance, the Spurs were more effective in finding the open man, shooting 67 percent from the field and 55 percent from three-point range. Without the double team in the halfcourt, the Spurs were a more manageable 47 percent and 40 percent, respectively.

This is another area where Miami was beaten: game adjustments. While Popovich could have made the adjustment of the series by inserting Diaw in the starting lineup in place of Splitter in Game 3 to counteract Heat coach Erik Spoelstra’s small lineup, Spoelstra couldn’t quite find the antidote to that move. In fact, his belated use of Michael Beasley, an effective scorer during the regular season, when the series was practically over in the clinching game could have been made earlier especially with the Heat badly in need of bench scoring.

But the Spurs’ great ball movement wouldn’t still have amounted to much had they not also been excellent shooters particularly from three-point range. Time and again, the Spurs’ three-point bombers, particularly Ginobili, Green, Mills and Leonard, made the Heat pay with their uncanny shooting from the outside. In Game 3, for example, the Spurs broke an NBA finals record by shooting 75.8 percent from the field in the first half, setting up their breakaway win. This was after just having set a record for a quarter’s shooting (14-of-16) in the fourth quarter of their 110-95 win in the first game.  

San Antonio in fact set a record for field-goal percentage for a final series by shooting 52.8 percent, breaking the previous mark of 52.7 shared by the 1991 Chicago Bulls and 1989 Detroit Pistons.  As a testament to how efficient the Spurs’ offense was, the Spurs had 51 more assists (127) and 10 fewer turnovers (69) than the Heat in the finals, with Miami turning it over 79 times, which was more than its assist total of just 76.  And the disparity in turnovers would have been bigger if not for the uncharacteristic 23 the Spurs committed in Game 1.

“The offense looked how a world-class orchestra sounds, with every instrument tuned to perfection,” Andy Bailey of Bleacher Report described of San Antonio’s well-orchestrated offense.

Credit has been given for San Antonio’s excellent marksmanship to the Spurs’ shooting coach Chip Engelland, the former Northern Consolidated Cement star who once played for the Philippine national team in the ‘80s. “The work he has done in developing shooters across the board is second to none,” Nurse marveled. “He’s helped transform Kawhi Leonard from a defense-only athlete into a legitimate three-point threat and offensive force. It makes a world of difference when everyone on the floor can stretch the defense with their shooting ability.”

The importance of the three-point shot has evolved to such an extent that this past season alone, the amount of threes attempted exceeded the previous record by more than 4,000 shots. The Heat, at least those coming off the bench, have fallen behind this curve as seen in these finals. While Green will never be regarded as a better player than Wade, for instance, it can be argued that he made a bigger impact in the series than James’ chief sidekick, whose play deteriorated especially in the last two games, where he scored just 21 points on 7-of-25 shooting, including 3-of-13 in the crucial Game 4. The 6-6 Green, meanwhile, shot 10-of-13 in the last two games and hit timely threes to keep a healthy distance between the Spurs and their rivals.

All of these, of course, only worked – and worked so effectively – due to the overriding philosophy that governed everything that the Spurs did, and that is all of them, including future Hall of Famers Duncan, Parker and Ginobili, were willing to subjugate their games for the interest of the team.  A lot of people talk about team philosophy, making sacrifices and some such other stuff, but it is the Spurs who make the best example of a real team doing all that.  That, not surprisingly, has been going on for almost two decades, or shortly before Duncan arrived in 1997 to join fellow star big man David Robinson, and it has made for a winning environment that’s responsible for the Spurs’ sustained success.

Popovich and Buford, who first joined San Antonio in 1988 and returned to the team in 1994 as head scout after short stints with the LA Clippers and the University of Florida to form a partnership with Pop, created that culture where all egos are checked and purged, if they’re not in the best interest of the team, by every player joining the Spurs. No less than Duncan, Parker and Ginobili have bought into this “team first” culture and passed it on to the younger generation, making it a lot easier for Popovich to impose on the younger players.

Everybody saw, for example, how Ginobili was about to check into the game in the second game of the final series. All of a sudden, Popovich yanked him back to the bench. Did Manu sulk or pout?  Of course not. He merely got back into investing himself in the contest, cheering and issuing shouts of instructions to teammates on the floor without any hint of annoyance.

A similar but more telling scenario happened in Game 4 involving Green, who just got faked into the air by Allen for a three-pointer from the corner. He got pulled out by Pop, who could be seen scolding him and even striking him in the butt. But Green took it all in stride and never pouted, standing up and cheering his teammates while waving a towel immediately after that.

This is why whenever a Spur messes up, accountability is immediately owned up by the player concerned, no questions asked. This happened twice this year when Ginobili and Parker were called down by Pop for playing poorly at certain points in the West finals and the championship series. Would Kobe Bryant or Carmelo Anthony or James do what Manu or Parker did without trying to at least justify to the media why they messed up? It’s highly doubtful given the egos involved.

Expecting Miami, therefore, to play like the Spurs did would also be highly doubtful simply because of the makeup of James, Wade, Bosh and company. They were mainly built on the strength of individual talent and brilliance, and when that brilliance somehow dims, they would have hardly anything to fall back on, something that would be enough to tide them over the way a team like the Spurs have. As American hoops junkie Rich Conte said, the Heat play the way they do simply “because that’s the only way their Big Three knew how to play, and that is reflective of how and why they came together in the first place.”

The Spurs, meanwhile, were brought together piece by piece, painstakingly nurtured and honed in the nuances of “The Spurs Way.” The teamwork, ball movement, shooting ability and their stars’ team-first philosophy were, in the end, the product of that culture that was developed over many years, not by a convenient, high-powered partnership that was forged almost overnight.  

SHORTSHOTS: The trio of Tim Duncan, Manu Ginobili and Tony Parker has further added to the most number of playoff wins by any trio in history – 117 – seven more than the 110 of the Lakers’ Magic Johnson, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar and Michael Cooper… Duncan now also owns the record for most double-doubles in the playoffs with 158, one more than Magic Johnson’s 157, as well as the mark for most minutes played in the postseason with 8,895, 44 minutes more than Abdul-Jabbar’s 8,851… Tony Parker, in a telling demonstration of the Spurs’ team philosophy, led San Antonio in scoring this postseason with just 17.4 points per game.  That’s the lowest average by a championship team’s leading scorer in the shot-clock era or since 1954-55… The Spurs averaged 118.5 points per 100 possessions and had an effective field goal percentage of 60.4 in this year’s finals, the highest in both categories in any final series since the three-point line was introduced in the 1979-80 season…  Kawhi Leonard became the third-youngest Finals MVP awardee since it was first handed out in 1968-69.  Leonard will just turn 23 on June 29, and just comes after Magic Johnson, who won it the first two times at age 20 and 22.  Teammate Duncan is the fourth-youngest now after winning it two months after turning 23 in 1999… Leonard’s defense on LeBron James in the series was key.  Though James shot 57.6 percent against him, the Heat superforward wasn’t always able to get his shot off or even get the ball.  Nineteen percent of James’ touches against Leonard resulted in a James field goal attempt, compared to 33 percent against all other defenders.  James was held without a touch on 33 percent of the Heat’s possessions when guarded by Leonard, compared to 23 percent against all other defenders. Leonard’s defense was still strong when he did find himself on someone other than James, with the rest of the Heat shooting just 27.8 percent (5-of-18) against him in the finals… Tim Duncan became just the second player in history to win an NBA title in three different decades, doing it with San Antonio in 1999, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2014. John Salley is the only other player to accomplish the feat, winning with Detroit in 1989 and 1990, with Chicago in 1996 and with the Lakers in 2000. – Rappler.com

Bert A. Ramirez has been a freelance sportswriter/columnist since the ’80s, writing mostly about the NBA and once serving as consultant and editor for Tower Sports Magazine, the longest-running locally published NBA magazine, from 1999 to 2008. He has also written columns and articles for such publications as Malaya, Sports Digest, Winners Sports Weekly, Pro Guide, Sports Weekly, Sports Flash, Sports World, Basketball Weekly and the FIBA’s International Basketball, and currently writes a fortnightly column for QC Life and a weekly blog for BostonSports Desk. A former corporate manager, Bert has breathed, drunk and slept sports most of his life.