There were a couple of questions the Milwaukee Bucks needed to answer in the buildup to their NBA Finals matchup against the Phoenix Suns.
There was the question of Giannis Antetokounmpo’s status leading into Game 1. The condition of his hyperextended left knee was widely seen as the deciding factor – if it continued to keep him out or hamper him, the Suns could very well have the series and the championship in hand. If it didn’t detrimentally keep Antetokounmpo from being his elite, two-way self, it would give the Bucks a deadly weapon with which to punish the Suns on both ends of the floor.
Not only was Antetokounmpo cleared to play, he also looked great for someone coming off a precarious lower-leg injury. He was spry on both ends, looking to force paint shots through penetration and low-post rim pressure, and was his lively self on help defense. He even ran the whole length of the floor to chase down a Mikal Bridges layup.
Antetokounmpo may not be completely 100%, but he looked good. The question of his status going forward seems less murky.
There was, however, the question of the Bucks’ defensive coverages against a Suns team that has shown the uncanny ability to beat every single kind of pick-and-roll coverage.
What would the Bucks start out with? Would they continue to switch everything, just like they did against the Atlanta Hawks in the Eastern Conference Finals? Would they go back to their deep drop? Or would they employ a mix of coverages or even in-between stuff – stepping up to the level of ball screens, hedging and recovering, or maybe even conditional switching on actions not involving the big?
That question was answered as soon as the Suns had their first offensive possession of the game.
In the possession below, the Suns start out in a “Horns” formation – two players at the elbows, two parked on each corner, with a ball handler up top – and run Devin Booker on an “Iverson” cut, which is a player cutting across the “nail” or free throw area while the two players at the elbows set staggered screens. But focus on the high ball screen set thereafter by Deandre Ayton:
With PJ Tucker guarding Chris Paul, the Bucks are more than willing to make that switch off the screen, for mainly two reasons: 1) Tucker guarding Paul means he will be switched onto Ayton, and while Tucker is disadvantaged when it comes to height, he has the heft and physicality to dislodge Ayton and put pressure on his lower body; 2) Brook Lopez is an underrated perimeter defender – by no means is he an elite, highly switchable big, but he has shown a propensity to survive and keep up with smaller and quicker guards, enough to make them settle for mid-range shots or contest their penetration to the rim.
Paul normally won’t miss shots like the one above, but it was clear that the Bucks were more than willing to live with mid-range shots, counting on stagnation and lack of ball movement to get stops, translating to better offensive possessions on the other end against a non-set defense.
The Bucks mostly kept to their switch-everything scheme in the first half, with mixed results. On some possessions, Lopez’s forays toward the perimeter worked to the Bucks’ advantage.
In the clip above, the Suns run “21,” otherwise known as “Pistol” action, with Paul handing the ball off to Booker, who then comes off a high ball screen from Ayton. Lopez switches onto Booker, who is more than capable of taking Lopez off the dribble and going all the way to the rim, or putting on the brakes for a mid-range shot. But Booker bails Lopez out with a pull-up three.
The Bucks will take such shots from Booker. During the regular season, Booker shot a measly 30.8% on pull-up threes. In the playoffs, that number hasn’t improved significantly – 32.8%.
But the Suns are an intelligent team. They relentlessly pound away at weaknesses without unnecessarily overstaying their welcome. When one approach doesn’t work, they have the aptitude and self-awareness to go another route.
The Suns run “Chicago” action in the possession below, which is a down screen for the corner man followed by a dribble hand-off:
The Bucks switch the hand-off, with Lopez finding himself once again on Booker. But focus on the other switch – Jrue Holiday, guarding Booker, finds himself having to switch onto Ayton. The problem with this switch is immediately apparent – Holiday finds himself on the wrong end of the switch, with Ayton having a clear diving lane, allowing him to go all the way to the rim and receive the lob from Booker.
Switching and getting favorable matchups also forced the Bucks to send help, opening up looks from the weak side. Here’s one example, where the Suns once again run “Pistol” action:
Lopez finds himself having to defend Booker again. Booker reverses to the right side to isolate, with Khris Middleton showing help on the strong side. Booker takes Lopez off the dribble – something he can do almost at will – and goes middle. Watch Holiday – he stunts at the nail, sagging off Paul to help on the Booker drive. That triggers the immediate kick-out to Paul on the weak-side wing, who subsequently buries the open three.
History repeats itself on this possession, which, as you would expect, starts with a mismatch:
The Suns run Booker through a Paul down screen and an Ayton hand-off – a somewhat compressed version of “Chicago” action – and forces Bobby Portis to switch onto Booker. If the idea of Lopez switching onto Booker or Paul was already a somewhat shaky proposition, having Portis switch onto them is approaching disastrous levels.
The Bucks know this, and they have Holiday help off the strong-side corner to help Portis on a potential drive. But helping off the strong-side corner is a defensive no-no. Booker knows this, and immediately seeks the kick out to Paul in the corner, punishing the Bucks helping one pass away.
Even on possessions where the Bucks were content with playing pure single-coverage defense despite a mismatch – with everyone else staying home and providing little-to-no help – their gamble of letting the Suns fly from mid-range and hope that they miss did not pay off.
The Suns have two of the deadliest mid-range operators in the game. Paul is arguably the all-time maestro who has perfected such a shot. Almost at will, he can get to his spots and pull up, and there is little that any defender can do to stop him from knocking them down.
Paul averaged 5.5 attempts in the mid-range during the regular season, with a success rate of 51.6% – the best among 12 players who attempted at least 5 such shots per game.
If Paul finds himself switched onto someone he can easily manipulate on a string, he has complete control:
With switching not working against Paul’s exceptional individual shot creation, the Bucks tried other coverages, including reverting back to their base drop scheme. Suffice to say, that also did not net them the results they were expecting.
Booker – whose 48.6% clip on 5.2 mid-range attempts per game during the regular season put him 5th in the list above – equally punished switches and drops. The common thread in the shots below can be seen: virtually no help coming from the weak side, no stunting or shading, and leaving the defender on an island against an elite mid-range shooter.
Booker excelled in the Suns’ bread-and-butter “Stack/Spain” pick-and-roll. He set solid back screens, while also diversifying his role in the action by opting not to set a back screen and instead popping out and flaring to the wing, taking advantage of a collapsing Bucks defense:
Seeing how the Suns picked apart just about everything the Bucks tried to do on defense, it begs the obvious question: Just what can the Bucks do on defense?
An obvious tip of the cap must be given to Paul and Booker, two supreme shot creators who are perfect for picking apart just about any kind of coverage teams throw at them. Paul finished with 32 points, 4 rebounds, and 9 assists, on a 63/57/100 shooting split and 77.1% true shooting. He scored half of his 32 points in the third quarter alone, on switches and drops such as the ones above.
Booker finished with 27 points and 6 assists, on a 38/13/100 shooting split. He shot poorly overall, but more than made up for it through his aggression, netting him 10 trips to the line and knocking down all of them.
If drops and switching didn’t work, perhaps a slight adjustment in personnel will. The Suns were able to generate mismatches mainly against the Bucks’ big-man duo of Lopez and Portis. This is by no means a call for them to be completely scratched from the rotation, especially with Lopez’s ability to stretch the floor on offense and rim protection on defense.
A hedge-and-recover scheme could also work, combined with a switch in defensive assignments. Tucker opened up on Paul, with Holiday on Booker. Maybe Holiday could do a much better job on Paul, especially in terms of fighting over screens and staying attached on drops or hedges. Tucker could bother Booker with his physicality and understated ability to keep up laterally.
But dedicating heavy minutes to an Antetokounmpo-anchored small lineup – with him at the 5 – might be the most prudent course of action. Antetokounmpo is a more versatile perimeter defender and can survive against switches, despite his occasional difficulty with lateral movement and navigation around screens. Such a lineup was seen in brief spurts in Game 1, with the Bucks managing to trim the deficit to single digits before the Suns pulled away for good.
Offense was another problem for the Bucks. Holiday (10 points on 4-of-14 shooting) struggled, while Middleton – despite putting up 29 points on 46.2% shooting – turned the ball over five times in a display of questionable decision making. Antetokounmpo had a double-double (20 points, 17 rebounds), but asking him to carry the offense off a knee injury might be too much, too soon.
The Suns will keep doing what they have done all season long – create a multitude of advantages and force the other team to play their own game, at their own pace. It’s on the Bucks to find a way to turn the tables on the advantage game. – Rappler.com
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