Are there lessons from the Philippines for Egypt?

On 3 July, the president of Egypt, Mohammed Morsi, was overthrown by a combination of public protests and a military coup, a transfer of power with echoes of the two EDSA people power revolts in the Philippines.  

As I write, tens of thousands of supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood are gathered in Cairo’s Tahir Square to protest the removal of a democratically elected president in an election generally regarded as fair. These demonstrations also have a close parallel in the Philippines, this time to the failed “EDSA 3” revolt that followed the arrest of the ousted Joseph Estrada in April 2001. 

The Philippines has recovered strongly from its turbulent recent past. Democracy seems secure and the economy is one of the strongest in Asia, with growth rates surpassing even those of China. This economic growth has mainly benefited the well-off, but Egypt, with an economy that is all but destroyed, would be only too happy to be where the Philippines is today, politically and economically. What are its chances of achieving this? 

The similarities between the Philippine and Egyptian cases mask important differences. 

State violence. One of the striking features of EDSA 1, 2 and 3 was the lack of violence, from protestors and governments alike. Four deaths were reported during EDSA 3, but the first two people power events in 1986 and 2001 took place with virtually no bloodletting. Credit for that is due both to the demonstrators and the two deposed presidents, Marcos and Estrada, a recording of Marcos’s denial of General Ver’s repeated requests for an iron fist to be used (“My order is not to attack”) being one of the more remarkable artefacts of the first EDSA revolt. 

By contrast, by Feb 9, 2011 (two days before Mubarak’s resignation) Human Rights Watch reported that 302 people had been killed since the start of Egypt’s pro-democracy uprising, with many thousands injured. This is almost certainly a significant underestimate. In the current round of pro-Morsi demonstrations, as of last week the official count of the dead stood at 82, but, again, the actual number is likely to be higher. If the current standoff between supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and the military-backed government escalates, it may turn out to be a lot higher.  

Strength of the democratic tradition. The Philippines has a far longer and stronger democratic tradition than Egypt. Although two Philippine presidents have been removed by extra-democratic means in the last 30 years, these events were exceptions rather than the rule. Despite its openness to capture by local and national elites, emphasis on superficialities, corruption, inability to police itself, and so on, Philippine democracy enjoys widespread legitimacy among Filipinos, even if accompanied by a slightly cynical shrug. Like the battered jeepneys that ply the streets of its capital, the Philippine democratic process is dysfunctional and illogical but it continues to exist and to perform the function it was created for, more or less. 

By contrast, the long shadow of the armed forces has blocked the democratic process in Egypt since the military coup that forced the abdication of King Farouk in 1952. The first multi-party presidential election was not held until 2005 (unsurprisingly, it resulted in an 88.6% majority for Mubarak). 

The involvement of the Philippine military in civilian government reached disturbing levels during the Arroyo administration, with generals or former generals holding numerous key cabinet portfolios, including executive secretary, defense, environment and natural resources, transport, and the National Bureau of Investigation. However, this process has been reversed since 2010 and in any event the power of the Philippine military in no way approximates that in Egypt, where the armed forces enjoy enormous power and independence, controlling “a labyrinth of companies that manufacture everything from medical equipment to laptops to television sets, as well as vast tracts of real estate, including the Sharm el-Sheikh resort where Mubarak owns a seaside palace,” according to Joshua Hammer. He estimates that the military commands as much as 40% of the Egyptian economy.

Ideological content. With the possible exception of EDSA 3, the Philippine revolts did not reflect deep ideological divisions in the country. There is a broad national consensus that a national leader has an obligation to pursue “good policies” within a liberal democratic framework; Marcos and Estrada were removed because they were judged to have broken that implicit social contract. 

No such consensus exists in Egypt, which is split between three very different notions of the role of the state. The Muslim Brotherhood is an anti-Western and pan-Islamic movement, with religious, social and political components. The demonstrators whose protests forced Morsi from office at the beginning of July have a completely different ideology, favoring a secular Western democracy with freedom of speech and religion. Finally, we can assume that there is also a significant body of opinion that is tired of the chaos and would prefer a return to the days of military rule.  

These three radically different concepts of the role of government have co-existed uneasily in the two and a half years since Mubarak’s resignation, but the recent series of anti- and pro-Morsi demonstrations indicates that this period is now at an end. One side will emerge victorious and will have to do what it can to bring the rest of the country on-side, which at this point seems a well-nigh impossible task.  

Long road ahead

Despite the similarities between the current events in Egypt and the People Power protests in the Philippines, there are significant structural differences between the two countries. Egypt has a long and difficult road ahead if it is to match the political and economic achievements of the Philippines. 

Perhaps the question needs to be changed around: what does the current situation in Egypt have to teach the Philippines?   

Beside the desperate situation in Egypt, the Philippines is an oasis of stability and economic achievement.  

Perhaps Filipinos need to consider why their country is in a better shape than Egypt and to strengthen those national tendencies that have guided it there: 

•reluctance to use violence in times of crisis; 

•faith in the democratic process, despite its flaws; 

•retention of the primacy of civilian authority over the military; and 

•a broad national consensus on the role of the state. – Rappler.com

Alastair Dingwall is the former senior editor of the Asian Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank Institute, and the World Health Organization. He was the author of the blog Torn and Frayed in Manila and the editor of The Traveller’s Literary Companion to Southeast Asia. He has worked in various editorial positions in Asia for 20 years.