Moro power and the MILF

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has recently announced that it would form the Bangsamoro Justice Party (BJP), a regional party that would field candidates for the Bangsamoro government that will be established once the Bangsamoro Basic Law is passed in Congress and approved by a plebiscite.

MILF Chair Al Haj Murad Ebrahim said this new party would not field candidates for governors and mayors but would focus on the regional government “because that is the result of the peace process.” This is a development that peace advocates welcome enthusiastically; after all, it is yet another evidence that the MILF is really serious about shifting its concerns fully to parliamentary struggle. (The communists are not happy but can’t do anything about this decision by the other armed threat to the Republic deciding to talk peace.)

However, note the focus of the MILF’s party building. It is the region not local, a nod by Murad et al. to the ruling families of Muslim Mindanao that it has no intention of challenging, much less dislodging them from power. Murad has, in fact, informed the media that some Muslim politicians have sent feelers to the MILF proposing possible coalitions that would help the fledgling BJP win seats.

This electoral ploy by the MILF raises some serious concern.

If you have copies of Francisco Lara’s and Steven Schoof’s Out of the Shadows: Violent Conflict and the Real Economy of Mindanao (International Alert and Anvil Publishing, 2013), Francisco Lara’s  Insurgents, Clans and States – Political Legitimacy and Resurgent Conflict in Muslim Mindanao, and Wilfredo Magno Torres III’s RIDO: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao (both published in 2014 by Ateneo de Manila University Press), it is worthwhile to read them now.

With rich empirical detail to back their conclusions, these authors point to two irrepressible features of Moro politics: the first is the enduring power political clans have over their constituents; and, second, the fusion of the licit and the illicit in the conduct of business and other economic activities in the Moro zone.  

The first feature is really nothing new. The Moro public intellectual Alunan Glang, in his now-classic book Muslim Secession or Integration? (1969), listed the following community issues and who the people would go to for succor.

• Family relations – our datu and mayor
• Agrarian problems – our datu and mayor
• Deciding whom to vote for during elections – our datu and mayor
• Boundary disputes – our datu and mayor
• Violations of the law – our datu and mayor
• Financial problems – our datu
• Agricultural problems – our datu and mayor
• Pilgrimages and religious matters – our religious leaders
• Health and sanitation – our datu and mayor
• Plant and animal pests – our datu and mayor
• Etc, etc, – our datu and mayor

Compromises

These sentiments have not changed over the years. Local power has survived the most profound transformations that Mindanao went through since the late 20th century. When Nur Misuari launched his separatist rebellion in 1975, local clans joined the MNLF especially after President Marcos undermined their powers. But once Marcos offered them back control of their bailiwicks, they readily abandoned Mas Nur and helped pave the way for further splits culminating in the formation of the MILF.

When the MNLF signed a peace agreement with the government in 1996, the rebels found themselves hampered in their efforts to govern by the presence of political clans, leading to compromises with the latter that disadvantaged the MNLF more than their new allies. Even the success of the Abu Sayyaf’s criminal enterprises relies on how much the kidnap group can placate local clans in their areas.

Local power assumed grotesque forms.

In Lanao del Sur, a drug trade in meta-amphetamine and later ecstasy (that the Lara and Schoof book tracks with exceptional detail) is thriving thanks in part to the blessings of some of the province’s clans, while in nearby Maguindanao province, the Ampatuans ruled with brutality, nurtured and protected by the very agencies of the national government. The rule of the clan leaders may have come to an end when they presided over the massacre of 58 people, forcing the hand of their patron, President Gloria Arroyo, but relatives still won in the 2010 elections, and today Maguindanao communities still fear the family’s presence.

Major constraints

Peace advocates may be surprised by the MILF’s move, but Murad et al. have a better sense of the realities on the ground. The MILF is simply not in a position to challenge the clans. Its army has been weakened by the Umbra Kato split and with many of its fighters having divided loyalties it could not afford to be sucked into another rido-instigated conflict like what happened in 2000.

The peace agreement has also prompted an organizational reorientation. Having witnessed the self-destruction of the MNLF when it was handed control of the ARMM, the MILF wants to make sure that its personnel will be competent bureaucrats. For these cadres, the days of fighting are over; it is now time to learn cost-benefit analysis and revenue collection.

Combined, post-war multi-tasking and a less-than-ideal armed capability are just two major constraints that the MILF must contend with. It will be interesting to watch what happens once this movement – one admired for its commitment to its principles – can overcome these. Will it eventually replace the clans and truly democratize Muslim Mindanao? – Rappler.com