All in the family
Many other leaders appear to be "pipelined" for the top leadership positions in their respective countries.
These include Rajiv Gandhi, the son of former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who in turn was the daughter of India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Another is Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel laureate who is now running for Parliament in Myanmar. She is the daughter of Aung San, whom many consider to be the founding father of the Union of Burma.
In varying degrees, political dynasties can exist in any democracy regardless of its structure, history, or the level of economic development of the country.
Legislators and parliamentarians with dynastic links range from 6% in the United States to as high as 37-40% in the Philippines and Mexico.
In the case of the Philippines, if we also consider familial links to local government units, the figure reaches an amazing 70%. Roughly 80% of the youngest legislators in the Philippines also hail from dynastic political families.
Dynasties across democracies nevertheless differ in important ways.
During the period between 1996 and 2007, over 90% of Japanese politicians were male and some 30% of the Japanese parliament was from political dynasties. Daughters are unlikely to form part of political dynasties in that country, as power is often passed on to sons.
A recent study noted that of over 120 Japanese politicians described as dynastic, only 3 are women.
On the other hand, one study of political dynasties in the US Congress showed how dynasties helped to improve the gender balance in the US Congress, by allowing more female legislators to get in via their familial ties.
Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore served for over 3 decades and remains the world’s longest serving Prime Minister. Most were not surprised when his eldest son, Lee Hsien Loong, eventually followed in his father’s footsteps and took over the reins of power in 2004.
Many credit the Lee dynasty for the sustained and stable reform and development process that have enabled Singapore to reach first world status today. Indeed some analysts concede that the performance of a government official is a function of the security and longevity of his or her tenure in office.
A famous theory by Mancur Olson suggests that even less benign leaders with a secure hold on power may behave like a "stationary bandits," benefiting from their position yet ensuring that growth and development nevertheless takes place in order to continue to secure their hold.
A darker view suggests that the less-benevolent and less-scrupled would turn to widescale and more destructive pillaging if given a short window of power.
There is really very little evidence to disprove either view.
While Lee Kuan Yew and his family presided over the rapid development and industrialisation of Singapore, other leaders with similar long stints in power were not as benign.
Examples include Ferdinand Marcos, who served as President of the Philippines and presided over a more than 20-year period which saw poverty almost double; and the Duvalliers in Haiti (Papa Doc the father who was President from 1957–71 and Baby Doc the son who was President from 1971–86), whose widely known regimes of plunder and excess left the country as the most indebted and least developed in Latin America.
Patterns of political dynasties in the Philippines offer a very sobering view of what political inequality looks like.
Our recent study of political dynasties in the 15th Philippine House of Representatives during the 2003–07 period suggests that about 80% of dynastic legislators experienced an increase in their net worth.
About half of the sample did so well that their asset growth beat the returns from investing in the Philippines Stock Exchange. Political dynasties in the Philippine Congress also tend to dominate the major political parties, comprising anywhere from 60–80% of each of the major parties (see Figure 1 below).
Political dynasties win in elections by much larger margins of victory, and in recent years increased as a share of the total legislators (see Figure 2 below).