[ANALYSIS] Power from Down Under: Strategic collaboration, not dependence

The following piece was first published on Analyzing War.

Australia’s security relations with the Philippines is nothing new. There is also nothing new about Manila’s proclivity for strategic dependence on a foreign power. Formerly America’s largest overseas military installation, US egress from the country in 1992 exposed gaps in Philippine strategic prioritization in relation to its national security.

Following recapture from Japanese forces during the liberation of the Philippines, Clark Air Field and Subic Bay became tangible symbols of US military might after World War II, allowing the Philippines to enjoy 46 years of direct American security that benefited the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). As a result, this period saw the AFP become a capable military that saw action in Korea and Vietnam alongside US-led coalition forces, and seriously considered an invasion of Sabah that Malaysia could not forgive to this day.

This security guarantee is highlighted by heavy military hardware that would have otherwise been difficult to acquire after the war. It directly benefited the Philippine Naval Patrol, for instance, in terms of hand-me-down warships that would later become the Philippine Navy’s (PN) legacy fleet today. But still, almost half a century of this arrangement did not mean it was a walk in the park for the AFP, as it was punctuated with the obstinate problem of Muslim rebellion in the south along with communist insurgency that metastasized nationwide.

Ad hoc legacy

Perhaps adding insult to injury is the strategic impairment at the highest levels of the government that the Marcos administration may have caused, as democracy was undermined to keep him in power for 20 years. This is a sizeable influence in terms of time, which is 27% of post-war policymaking since 1946. It is not unlikely, therefore, that it led to a legacy of expediency and shortcuts that his strongman rule demonstrated, and that – as Australian ambassadors to the Philippines between 1966 to 1973 had noted in their diplomatic memoirs – Marcos’s advisers may have at least shared the intuition that even ad hoc policymaking, which lacked the benefit of thorough research that could have informed high-level meetings, will not hurt the country too much. Once again, it was likely that the perceived costs of a strategic blunder with long-term implications was low, owing to US military presence in the country.

Although Marcos was seen as part of the authoritarian wave swelling up in Asia along with Korea and Taiwan, it soon became disconcerting even for Ronald Reagan that unchecked strongman rule led to poor governance and illegitimacy, which opened the Philippines to even greater communist advances.

Rightly so, dissatisfaction translated to overlapping and the succeeding formation of the communist New People’s Army (NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front, that reached a peak of 25,200 and 30,000 armed fighters respectively. As a consequence, the AFP would reputedly suffer its highest casualties from heavy fighting against internal security threats from 1973 towards the end of the Cold War in 1991. For the commanding general of the Philippine Army from 1976 to 1981 – who lost his own son during a gun battle against the NPA in the Visayas while serving as an army officer – Manila nearly lost Mindanao following this confluence of events.

Deeper security relations

Canberra came to Manila’s aid as soon as the US left, which triggered a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for Cooperative Defense Activities in 1995 between the two capitals – the same year China began occupying the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef that would serve as precursor to its island-building 10 years later. Australia would easily replace the US as the biggest provider of professional military education for the AFP,  increasing the quota for Filipino military officers by 300% in the immediate years following 1995, but nothing more.

Times have changed, however, as the second decade of the 21st century draws to a close. Australia and the Philippines have ostensibly moved past this “soft” area of defense cooperation through education and training to deepen their security relationship. Along with annual military exercises between the two countries, an MOU to Combat International Terrorism was signed in 2003, giving way to Australian military support during the Marawi siege and Operation Augury. Canberra also donated 21 airboats to the Philippine Army in 2010 while agreeing later to build 6 brand new offshore patrol vessels for the PN worth US$600 million.

These developments, however, are merely policy manifestations that are driven by something deep-seated and might still remain unfavorable towards regional security. Despite promising signs in Philippine security relations with Australia as previously mentioned, it should be noted that the 2012 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Canberra took the Philippine senate 5 years to deliberate.

This may well reflect the Marcos administration’s legacy of strategic impairment that results in an inability to deliver on urgent policy requirements, particularly those concerning national security. This can be observed in a series of major issues across recent administrations that bear similarity to the strongman’s brand of executive exploitation: violation of public coffers that continue to haunt the AFP’s military modernization; electoral fraud; fatal shortcuts made in botched special operations from Merdeka to Exodus; and engagement with the communist bloc promoting acceptance that China is now “in possession” of the South China Sea.

At the same time, the US has a number of policy workarounds in place such as the Visiting Forces Agreement, Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and the enduring Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, further raising the threshold for insecurity vis-à-vis external threats. It’s like America never really left, that brings to mind the dictator’s disinterest in an ad hoc foreign policymaking. Now that Australia has managed to insert itself as a de facto security guarantor for the Philippines albeit absent a defense treaty, it may not be a remote possibility that Manila’s proclivity for strategic dependence is further enabled.

Additionally, notwithstanding the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the AFP’s offensive against Camp Abu Bakr in 2000, it took 12 years for the China threat to resurface in Manila’s strategic consciousness as it dealt with the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff, the point when the AFP had already declined by many decades. Hence, whereas one can now hope that Manila has already run out of extenuating circumstances to defer proactive national security policymaking, the pandemic hit and threatens to bankrupt public coffers. This time, strategic dependence on China is an option, perhaps as a middle power strategy to reverse consequences of antagonism against the West that began in 2016.

Not the military’s fault

There is a recognition that Philippine-Australian relations hold plenty of promise, but the way forward may not be genuinely beneficial for the Philippines and the region. For example, an evaluation of the 2015 partnership agreement between the two countries merely reflects routine options that have been traditionally practiced by Manila with other countries, but it does not reflect how it can move from being a security beneficiary – one that is dependent on a foreign power – to a security provider and regional leader.

Nevertheless, at times complications borne out of policy prescriptions can be manifold, and the South China Sea is complicated enough to limit options available to the free world. A good starting point is to leverage on Australia’s unique relationship with the Philippines: that absent any colonial baggage similar to Washington’s, the Defense department can utilize Canberra to influence key policy imperatives that will maintain the centrality of its military modernization in policy circles and with policymakers.

Climate change is a notable policy loophole that can be reframed as a thematic strategic adversary that will mitigate Manila’s strategic amnesia vis-à-vis its defense posture, and help address the AFP’s inability to reciprocate the Australian Defense Force due to its “relative weakness and ineffectiveness.”

Indeed, the legacy of strategic impairment and propensity for dependence have arguably resulted in the military’s neglect that the PN’s planned 30-ship acquisition, for example, might be jeopardized. The acquisition has a 5 to 10-year timeline, which might figuratively gather dust just as how the SOFA with Australia took 5 years to come through.

Manila must begin thinking long-term, meaning current relations with Canberra is merely instrumental from the Australian standpoint and, hence, will recede once the China threat is sufficiently addressed. So long as Australia’s perceived security interests call for it, they will be there for the Philippines. This is a window of opportunity for Manila to improve its strategic culture – while two major powers are holding the line for it – to effectively drive a self-reliant and credible defense posture. – Rappler.com

Mark Payumo is an international security analyst. He graduated from the Philippine Military Academy in 2006.