By this time, there has been quite a bit of ink spilled on the candidates running for president. Arguments for candidates range from simple sentiment (they feel like the right person for the job) to an actual track record (they have done a good job elsewhere). As Filipinos head to the polls, those of us who are undecided may want to consider a piece of information in addition to a candidate’s promises and public record: Who are their “friends?” By “friends,” I mean their backers, political networks, and allies. Are they likely to extract favors that come at a hefty price for the poor and the marginalized? Are they likely to hold the candidate accountable when they commit corrupt acts or human rights violations? If the backers have a track record of promoting the social good, can they credibly influence the candidate? 

The method of judging a candidate using their political networks is not new to Filipinos. In many of our barrios and barangays, one of the questions people ask on the campaign is, “Kaninong bata yan?” (Whose “kid” or crony is that?) Recent research on corruption and political networks affirms the underlying political savvy of this question. A 2018 study using data from Brazil, for example, finds that a person’s political networks can predict whether they would be involved in an incidence of corruption. Another 2021 study based on field work in Mexico finds that political networks tend to become a support system for corruption among their members. This is because officials and politicians will want to maintain their coalition’s power even if it means tolerating corruption among their friends and allies.  

But one might object: these days, it is easy to look at a person’s track record. Why the need for another proxy? The presidency is unlike any other job. While it is formally an administrative position, the president also commands the armed forces and police, giving them a degree of power unlike any other elected official. Moreover, the president can pick judges and use executive orders to enact their desired policies. Because of the change in power and responsibility, the incentives of a sitting president change. Their past record of public service is, at best, an incomplete proxy for how one will govern. Like any elected position, the presidency is prone to what economists call moral hazard. Someone who believes that they are insulated from the adverse consequences of their actions is more likely to behave in a risky manner, to the detriment of those who have an interest in their performance. A newly elected president can take their election as a mandate to play loose with the rules since they are already in a position of power.  

Since no individual voter can change a president’s incentives, the best we can do is to get as much information to help us pick the right person. Financiers, patrons, and allies can tell us things that a record in public service cannot. Even with the best of intentions, every politician is likely beholden to their “friends.” Someone who relies on the support of a corrupt public figure for votes is unlikely to pursue an anti-corruption agenda even if they had done so in a different office. Similarly, someone who promises land reform but is backed by large landowners is not likely to follow through. Thus, patronage, alliances, and financiers can inform us about who is likely to exert pressure and sway the policies of a newly elected president. 

The case of Duterte 

Let’s apply our framework to the rather tough case of Rodrigo Duterte, who built an eclectic coalition of progressives, agribusiness interests, militarists, and authoritarian sympathizers. His public supporters ran the gamut from labor activists, FVR, to the Marcoses. How would one have approached his candidacy to know what type of president he would have been? 

First, his alliance with the Marcoses should have been an immediate signal that he would not pursue an anti-corruption agenda against the most powerful. Hardly anyone does. However, Duterte’s affinity with the Marcoses simply due to their endorsement and mobilization in the 2016 campaign was a clear signal that he was willing to dole out favors. The anti-corruption talk was merely, well, talk. 

Duterte’s affinity with the Marcoses was also a clear embrace of authoritarian rule. Part of the Marcoses’ disinformation campaign in the past few years is to portray Martial Law as a kind of golden age that brought the peace and prosperity the country needed. Duterte, if anything, embraced this vision of autocracy as an inheritor of the Marcos legacy. In doing so, he signaled the coming brutality that he would exercise against the poor while excusing his wealthy and powerful hangers-on.  

Second, his 10 biggest campaign contributors represented mining (Uy, Alcantara) and agribusiness (Floirendo) elites. They would have opposed environmental protections, ending contractualization, and amending agribusiness contracts in favor of small landholders and agrarian reform beneficiaries. While Duterte flirted with progressive politics and figures, his top 10 financiers indicated that progressive policies would never be a priority.  

Duterte’s political networks, his “friends,” helps distinguish the signal from the noise that came from his hours-long speeches. His most powerful backers were traditional politicians and his campaign financiers. They would never have gone for worker’s rights and agrarian justice. Patronage and drug wars, however, were fair game. Even if Duterte wanted to pass progressive reforms, the people surrounding him were the types who would not allow it. Moreover, he had enough people around him who have already shown a general disregard for human life. Thousands of lives later, we know which interests won him over. Thus, despite his eclectic coalition, Duterte’s political networks were very telling of the type of policies he would enact.  

So, before heading to the polls on May 9, you may want to ask, “Kaninong bata yan?” – Rappler.com

Alfredo RM Rosete is an Assistant Professor of Economics, Central Connecticut State University.